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ABSTRACT 
This study extends an original bioeconomic model of optimal duck harvest and 
wetland retention by bringing in amenity values related to the nonmarket (in situ) benefits 
of waterfowl plsi the ecosystem values of wetlands themselves. The model maximizes 
benefits to hunters as well as the amenity values of ducks and ecosystem benefits of 
wetlands, subject to the population dynamics. Results indicate that wetlands and duck 
harvests need to be increased relative to historical levels. Further, the socially optimal 
ratio of duck harvest to wetlands is larger than what has been observed historically. 
Including amenity values leads to a significant increase in the quantity of wetlands and 
duck harvests relative to models that focus only on hunting values. 
Keywords: bioeconomic modelling; wetland protection; wildlife management; 
nonmarket values; Prairie pothole region 




Bioeconomic modeling of wetlands and waterfowl in Western 
Canada: Accounting for amenity values 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
Climate change is expected to increase drought in Canada’s grain belt, with 
projections suggesting that the 21
st Century will be substantially drier than the previous 
one. A major casualty will be North America’s duck factory – the pothole region of the 
southern Prairie Provinces. A drier climate will reduce the number of wetlands, which 
will have an adverse impact on agricultural ecosystems and the region’s ability to 
produce waterfowl, as is clearly demonstrated by the high correlation between wetlands 
and breeding duck populations (Figure 1).  
Wetland ecosystems are important not only for producing waterfowl, but also for 
the ecosystem services they provide. The latter include filtration of agricultural and other 
pollutants (thereby improving the quality of ground and some surface waters), provision 
of water for livestock and wildlife, visual and recreational amenities, greenhouse gas 
storage, and so on. Wetlands are also adversely impacted by policies that seek to mitigate 
climate change, particularly policies that subsidize production of corn, canola and other 
crops for biofuels, as their production increases the relative value of land in agriculture 
relative to wetlands.
1
                                                 
1 Crutzen et al. (2008) argue that the nitrogen oxides released from production of biofuels 
negate the CO2-reducing benefits of replacing fossil fuels, and, particularly for canola, 
actually lead to an increase in relative warming.  
 Yet, waterfowl management models tend to focus on the hunting 
benefits of waterfowl, with wetlands often considered extraneous to the determination of 
hunting season length and bag limits – the tools of waterfowl management. Although  
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decisions on optimal wetland retention are considered in some models, the value of the 











































Figure 1: Relationship between Wetlands and Waterfowl in Canada’s Grain Belt, 1955-
2009 
One of the earliest bioeconomic models of migratory waterfowl is due to Gardner 
Brown and Judd Hammack (Hammack and Brown 1974; Brown and Hammack 1973; 
Brown, Hammack and Tillman 1976). The model is discussed in more detail in the next 
section; here we note that the authors used a Beverton-Holt production function, 
estimates of duck survival rates and results from a U.S. survey of duck hunters to 
determine optimal levels of duck harvests and wetland protection. From these, they 
concluded that there were too few wetlands (by some 18% to 55%) in Canada’s southern 
Prairie Provinces. Johnson et al. (1997) also focused on duck hunting, using a stochastic 
dynamic programming framework to address uncertainty related to random environ-
mental and population variations and incomplete control over hunters’ decisions. They 
find that, as wetlands in Canada’s pothole region increase, the optimal management  
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strategy is to have a more liberal hunting regime (longer hunting seasons and higher bag 
limits).  
Recognizing that the majority of hunters are located in the United States (Figure 
2) while the preponderance of breeding habitat is in Canada, the 1986 North American 
Waterfowl Management Plan (U.S. Department of Interior and Environment Canada 
1986) was implemented as a mechanism by which the U.S. could compensate Canadian 
landowners for the positive externality that greater numbers of ponds in Canada provided 
U.S. hunters.
2
In addition to their consumptive use value to hunters, waterfowl also have non-
consumptive use value (which might be negative for some who are adversely affected by 
goose droppings, for example), while wetlands have a variety of consumptive and non-
consumptive use and non-use values (e.g., visual amenities) outside of their role in 
producing waterfowl. Therefore, management plans need to focus on the existence value 
of waterfowl and the amenity values of wetlands as much as or more so than hunting 
value. That is, a bioeconomic model of waterfowl and wetlands must simultaneously 
determine optimal strategies for managing waterfowl (setting harvest levels through 
decisions concerning season length and bag limits) and wetlands (determining how much 
wetland, or how many ponds, to retain).  
 However, NAWMP was criticized for, among other things, simply 
offsetting the negative impacts of extant Canadian agricultural subsidies (van Kooten 
1993a). 
                                                 
2 The focus of NAWMP was not only on provision of ponds. The program provided 
payments to farmers for providing dense nesting cover on lands that would otherwise be 
cropped, thereby enhancing the ability of waterfowl to reproduce. Ideally sites are to be 
fenced to keep out predators, but payments are usually inadequate. See van Kooten and 






































































Figure 2b: Harvests of Ducks, Geese and All Waterfowl, Canada’s Prairie Provinces, 
1969-2008 
 
Finally, waterfowl do not simply disappear when wetland area is reduced. They 
adapt by breeding in agricultural regions to the north, where (more plentiful) wetlands 
may become ice free earlier in the spring as a result of climate change, or they breed in 
the boreal forest zone of the Canadian Shield, although, in that case, productivity may be 
reduced. The point is that waterfowl management needs to take into account spatial as  
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well as dynamic aspects. At the heart of any spatial-dynamic model is the diffusion or 
dispersal process that governs the way waterfowl spread over space and create patterns 
(Wilen 2007). Patterns are generated by dynamic and spatial forces, of which climate is 
likely primary.  
One can think about a hierarchy of bioeconomic models for wetland-waterfowl 
management and policy analysis. First come models that focus solely on the value of 
waterfowl to hunters, with wetlands considered exogenous (although their marginal value 
can be derived). Next come models that take into account amenity values of wetlands and 
the consumptive and non-consumptive values of waterfowl. Both classes of models could 
and perhaps should be characterized by uncertainty. Finally, models need to consider 
spatial aspects that affect the selection of breeding sites by returning birds. Although 
aspatial modeling can shed light on the impacts of climate change as the number of 
recruits (new ducks) is a function of wetland area (ponds) that is, in turn, dependent on 
climate factors, spatial factors should be included in future modeling efforts (Anderson 
and Titman 1992). In this paper, we only extend the hunting model to focus on the 
nonmarket values of wetlands and waterfowl, leaving to future research the impact of 
uncertainty and, importantly, climate change and spatial aspects.  
The objectives in this study are, therefore, to (1) extend an original bioeconomic 
model by Brown and Hammack (1973), and Hammack and Brown (1974), hereafter 
H&B (1973, 1974), by bringing in amenity values related to the nonmarket (in situ) 
benefits of waterfowl and the ecosystem values of wetlands themselves; and (2) compare 
the outcomes of a model that considers only hunting values of waterfowl (the original 
H&B model) with those of our extended model. Opportunities and challenges of the  
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extended model will be discussed as will directions for future research. 
2.  BIOECONOMIC MODELING 
Brown and Hammack (1973) were the first to use mathematical bioeconomic 
models (Clark 1976) to address wetland conservation. Such models optimize an objective 
subject to technical, biological, socioeconomic and political constraints. Approaches 
range from analytic to numeric, from deterministic to stochastic, from static to dynamic, 
from non-spatial to spatial (e.g. Dasgupta and Maler 2004; Miranda and Fackler 2002). 
Most models rely on computational methods that have been used extensively in 
agriculture (Howitt 2005; McCarl and Spreen 2004). H&B (1973, 1974) focused on duck 
hunting values, ignoring other waterfowl values and wetland benefits. We begin with a 
variant of the H&B model, and then expand the model to include the non-consumptive 
use value of waterfowl and, importantly, the in-situ value of wetlands.  
Simple Waterfowl Harvest Model 
H&B (1973) and Brown et al. (1976) specify a discrete bioeconomic optimal 






t t t t W C Z y h v ρ ∑ −
=1
) ( ) , , (
 The objective is to 
maximize benefits to hunters minus the costs of providing wetlands:  
,  (1) 
where v(ht, yt, Zt) is a function describing the benefits derived from duck hunting, which 
is a function of the number of ducks harvested (h), per capita income of duck hunters (y), 
                                                 
3 Johnson et al. (1997) extend H&B’s simple harvest management model to include 
uncertainty due to random environmental variation, incomplete control over harvests, and 
uncertainty about survival and reproduction. We also leave uncertainty to future research.  
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and such things as age, gender and outdoor experience that characterize duck hunters (Z); 
C(Wt) is the cost of providing W amount of wetlands (measured by the number of ponds); 
and ρ = 1/(1+r) is the discount factor with r the discount rate used by the hypothetical 
planner. The length of the planning horizon is T, and could possibly be infinite. In the 
H&B model, harvest levels and the number of ponds are decision variables.
4
Ducks breed in the prairie pothole region in May and begin the fall flight south in 
September, which is also the start of hunting season. The fall flight consists of the 
fraction s1 of May breeding ducks (Dt) that survive to September, plus offspring 





2≤0. Equation (1) is maximized subject to the 
following bioeconomic constraints:  
 
Dt+1 = s2 [s1 Dt + g(Dt, Wt) – π ht],  (2) 
Dt, ht, Wt ≥ 0; and D0 > 0, W0 > 0 given  (3) 
where Dt+1 is the number of mature ducks returning to the prairie pothole breeding 
grounds in year t+1, s1 is the fraction of May breeders surviving to September, s2 is the 
fraction of mature ducks that are not killed by hunters and survive to return to the 
breeding grounds in year t+1, and π > 1 accounts for the loss of ducks that are killed or 
maimed by hunters but not collected or reported. Conditions (3) are non-negativity 
requirements and initial conditions regarding the numbers of ducks and ponds. 
Applying Bellman’s principle of optimality leads to the following recurrence 
relation known as Bellman’s equation (Léonard and Van Long 1992, pp.174-176): 
                                                 
4 H&B multiply v(.) by the number of hunters, the control variable if bag limits and 
average take per hunter are constant. Here v(.) is simply the benefit to all hunters.   
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+ + + − t t t t t t
t
D V W C Z y h v
W h
ρ   (4) 
where Vt is a value function and λt = ∂Vt/∂Dt is the shadow price of an additional duck. 
Equation (4) can be solved using backward recursion based on the assumption that the 
authority behaves optimally in the future so that the value at time t+1, Vt+1, is the best one 
can do.
5
Assuming an interior solution, the first-order conditions are: 
 The first-order conditions are found by first setting ∂Vt/∂ht = 0 and ∂Vt/∂Wt = 0, 
and then differentiating both sides of (4) by the state variables Dt (recalling that Dt+1 is a 
function of Dt).  
∂Vt/∂ht = ∂v/∂ht – ρ λt+1 s2 π = 0  (5a) 
∂Vt/∂Wt = –c + ρ λt+1 s2 ∂g/∂Wt = 0  (5b) 
∂Vt/∂Dt = λt = ρ λt+1 s2 (s1 + ∂g/∂Dt)  (5c) 
where c = dC/dWt is the cost of providing an additional pond.
6 Additionally, the state 
equation (2) must be satisfied; the sufficient conditions for a maximum are guaranteed by 
Bellman’s optimality principle with limt→∞ λt ρ
t Dt = 0.
7
From maximum principle (5a), we find that (1/π) ∂v/∂ht = ρ λt+1 s2, which says 
that hunting should continue until the value of the marginal duck that is harvested 
 Equations (5a) and (5b) 
constitute a maximum principle, while equation (5c) is the co-state equation. 
                                                 
5 The backward recursive approach of dynamic programming best lends itself to 
numerical solutions. In that case, T must be finite and the value VT(DT) must be specified.  
6 The marginal cost of providing an additional pond need not be constant, but could be a 
function of the number of ponds, so that we would write c(Wt) = dC/dWt. 
7 Notice also that functions v(.) and g(.) are taken to be non changing over time. Further, 
the last condition says that either it is optimal to drive the duck population to zero at 
some future time or the present shadow value of an additional duck is zero.  
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(adjusted for the fact that not all birds killed are recovered) equals the user cost of taking 
that bird (which equals its discounted shadow value adjusted for the fact that not all 
unharvested ducks survive to breed the following spring). Similarly, from maximum 
principle (5b), we find that ρλt+1 s2 ∂g/∂Wt = c, which says that wetlands should be 
protected or created to the point at which the marginal value of an additional wetland in 
the production of ducks that return to the breeding ground next year equals the (marginal) 
cost of providing that wetland. The shadow value of next year’s duck is adjusted by the 
discount factor ρ and the mortality risk. The shadow price of a pond, therefore, is given 
by its value in the production of future ducks. In the next subsection, we consider its 
amenity value in addition to its value in producing waterfowl. 
Equation (5c) is simply an arbitrage condition. It requires that hunters take into 
account the value of allowing some ducks to escape to next year so they can breed to 
make more birds available in the future. Thus, the discounted future (shadow) value of 
allowing a duck to escape (adjusted for mortality and the marginal growth in duck 
population) must equal the current (shadow) value of harvesting that duck.  
  Substitute ρ λt+1 s2 from (5a) and from (5b) into (5c) to get the following 






























= λ .  (6b) 
Setting (6a) equal to (6b), and rearranging, gives a relationship similar to (5b), but one  
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that more clearly spells out the relationship between ponds and the value of waterfowl: 
























.  (7) 
The left-hand side of (7) is the (marginal) cost of providing an additional pond while the 
right-hand side is the value of the additional pond in the production of ducks for hunters. 
A steady-state solution is found by letting λt+1=λt and Dt+1=Dt, ∀t. We then find 























+ 1 1 2 , and  (8b) 
(1 – s1s2)D = s2 g(D,W) – π h.  (8c) 
Once functional forms and associated parameters are chosen for C(.), v(.) and g(.), and 
the parameters s1, s2, r and π are determined, it is possible to find the optimal waterfowl 
population and optimal decisions concerning harvests and number of ponds that 
maximize the planner’s wellbeing. (The three equations are used to solve for three 
unknowns.) However, wellbeing is based solely on benefits to hunters and excludes any 
other values of wetlands and waterfowl. 
An Extended Bioeconomic Model of Waterfowl and Wetlands 
We extend the original model by bringing in two types of amenity values – one is 
related to the nonmarket (non-consumptive use) benefits of waterfowl, while the other 
takes into account the amenity (ecosystem) values of wetlands themselves. Because we  
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include amenity values for both wetlands and waterfowl, the objective function (1) is 





t t t t t t W C W B D Z y h v ρ α ∑ − + +
=1
) ( ) ( ) , , ( ,  (9) 
where α is the amenity value of ducks, which could be positive for small numbers of 
ducks and negative for large numbers, say if large numbers lead to crop depredation. To 
keep things simple, we assume the amenity value is a positive constant. B(Wt) is a 
wetlands ecosystem benefit function with ∂
2B/∂Wt > 0 and ∂
2B/∂Wt
2 ≤ 0.  
The revised Bellman equation becomes:  





+ + + − + + t t t t t t t t
t
D V W C W B D Z y h v
W h
ρ α .  (10) 
The first-order conditions are now: 
∂Vt/∂ht = ∂v/∂ht – ρ λt+1 s2 π = 0  (11a) 
∂Vt/∂Wt = B′(Wt) – c + ρ λt+1 s2 ∂g/∂Wt = 0  (11b) 
∂Vt/∂Dt = λt = α + ρ λt+1 s2 (s1 + ∂g/∂Dt)   (11c) 
The interpretation of equation (11a) is identical to that of (5a), while (11b) is similar to 
(5b), except for the additional term related to the marginal ecosystem benefits provided 
by wetlands, B′(Wt). This is seen when we rearrange (11b) as follows: c = B′(Wt) + ρ λt+1 
s2 ∂g/∂Wt. The left-hand side of this expression is the current cost of an additional pond, 
which is simply the cost of establishing or protecting it. The right-hand side is the 
marginal benefit of an additional pond, which consists of the current marginal amenity 
value of the pond, B′(Wt), plus the shadow value of its marginal contribution to future  
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production of ducks discounted to the present.  
The final condition (11c) is similar to (5c) except for the additional term α, which 
is the non-consumptive use value of a duck. Re-write (11c) as λt – α = ρλt+1 s2(s1+∂g/∂Dt). 
From the perspective of the planner, the shadow value of the marginal duck to hunters is 
reduced by α, indicating that the planner needs to take into account amenity values by 
raising the population of waterfowl over that in the previous model where ducks only had 
value to hunters. More ducks are allowed to escape to the next year than previously to 
satisfy both the need to make more birds available to hunters in the future and the non-
consumptive use value ducks provide.  
Again letting λt+1=λt and Dt+1=Dt, ∀t, we can derive the modified steady-state 



































2 2 1 , and  (12b) 
(1 – s1s2)D = s2 g(D, W) – π h.  (12c) 
Compared with results (8), those in (12) are modified to take into account the amenity 
values of in-situ wetlands and ducks, with only (12c) identical to (8c). Again, once 
parameters and functional forms have been determined, the three equations in (12) are 
used to solve for steady state levels of harvest, ponds and duck population.  
3.  WATERFOWL VALUATION AND THE EQUATIONS OF MOTION 
An important component of bioeconomic modeling is the specification and  
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estimation of the objective function and the state equations (or equations of motion). 
Given lack of information about the demand function for duck hunting, we adapt the 
equation estimated by Brown and Hammack (H&B 1973) using H&B’s (1974, p.29) 
mean values of the regressors, but adjusting mean hunters’ incomes and expenditures on 
duck hunting by the U.S. CPI. The resulting valuation function is then v(h) = 1.62 h
 0.409. 
This function gives values of $2.15 for the harvest of two ducks and $3.37 for six ducks, 
while the marginal value of the sixth duck is $0.24; these values are clearly several orders 
of magnitude too small. H&B also multiplied this relation by the number of hunters.  
In 2007, a total of 815,300 duck hunters in the Mississippi, Central and Pacific 
flyways spent an average of 7.2 days in the field and bagged 15.7 ducks; in 2008, 
802,400 hunters harvested an average of 14.8 ducks and spent 7.1 days on the activity 
(Table 1). Using 1972-2008 data for Alberta, harvests averaged 12.8 ducks per hunter 
annually. Based on 20 studies, Loomis (2000) finds an average value of a wilderness 
recreation day to be $39.61 in 1996 US dollars, or $53.83 in 2008 after adjusting for 
inflation. Assuming duck hunters spend an average of 7 days in the field and harvest 14.5 
birds, each bird is then worth approximately $26. Multiply this value by an average 
harvest of 12.3 million ducks over 2007 and 2008 in the Mississippi, Central and Pacific 
flyways gives a total benefit of $319.8 million. Assuming that the parameter value on 
harvest is 0.6, we calculate v(h) = 70.947 h
 0.6, with v(h) and h measured in millions; if 
the original parameter is used, we find v(h) = 114.580 h
 0.409. We consider both functions 
as a sensitivity analysis.  
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Table 1: Duck Hunting and Harvest Data, United States, 2007 and 2008 







Mississippi  2007  6,719,700  474,400  14.2  3,479,100  7.3 
  2008  6,522,900  466,400  14.0  3,410,000  7.3 
             
Central  2007  2,666,000  193,400  13.8  1,127,400  5.8 
  2008  2,086,700  178,300  11.7  946,100  5.3 
             
Pacific  2007  3,441,000  147,500  23.3  1,269,900  8.6 
  2008  3,300,600  157,700  20.9  1,303,300  8.3 
             
U.S. Totals  2007  14,578,900  995,700  14.6  6,978,400  7.0 
  2008  13,723,200  980,500  14.0  6,686,400  6.8 
Source: http://www.fws.gov/migratorybirds/NewReportsPublications/HIP/hip.htm (as 
viewed January 7, 2010) 
 
Woodward and Yong-Suhk (2001), and Brander, Florax and Vermaat (2006), 
used meta-regression analysis to determine the ecosystem service values of wetlands. The 
average wetland value in Brander et al. was $2800 per hectare, but the median value was 
only $150, indicating that the distribution of values is skewed with a long tail of high 
values. The median North American wetland value is somewhat higher than that in other 
locations, but much less than that for Europe, while wetlands of northern grain belt are 
likely to be less valuable than those elsewhere on the Continent. In Woodward and Song-
Suhk, the average value of wetland services for benefit transfer purposes in Canada is 
$137 per acre, while the minimum value is $51 per acre. Furthermore, Cortus et al. 
(2010) estimate net public benefits of wetland retention in Saskatchewan; their ‘best 
estimate’ is $81.55 per hectare, while the low estimate is $39.62. In the current study, we 
use the low value of wetlands benefits from Cortus et al. (2010) as the base case but 
conduct sensitivity analysis using their best estimate.  
In the above studies, benefits are measured in hectares or acres, and are not on a  
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pond basis. Cowardin, Shaffer and Arnold (1995) find that 78% of wetlands in the 
northern U.S. Great Plains cover 0.41 ha or less. Assuming an exponential distribution 
(which has only one parameter), we calculate the average pond to have an area of 0.27 
ha.
8
The net opportunity costs of protecting or restoring wetlands equals the reduction 
in the value of cultivated land or land in its best alternative use. In cases where flooding 
is common, or where wetlands are permanent, the cost might be zero. Net returns to 
agricultural land vary considerably from year to year, from one crop to another, and 
across the prairie pothole region. Cultivated areas in summer fallow and seeded acreage 
are provided in Figure 3, as are the number of May ponds, for the period 1955 to 2009. 
May ponds and the average subsidy paid per cultivated hectare are plotted in Figure 4. 
Clearly, the reduction in summer fallow area is the main driver for increases in seeded 
area, while ponds exhibit no discernable trend over the period 1955-2009. Ponds appear 
randomly distributed about a mean of about 3.4 million, likely depending more on 
climate factors than anything else. However, an inverse relationship between ponds and 
subsidies is discernable in Figure 4, particularly after about 1983 when Canadian 
agricultural subsidies rose rapidly in response to EU and U.S. agricultural programs. 
 Then the base case value is $10.69 per pond and the higher estimate for sensitivity 
purposes is $22.01 per pond, or constant marginal benefit of $10 and $22 per pond for 
convenience. 
                                                 
8 The cumulative probability function is: Prob(x<X) = 1 – e
–3.693 x. H&B (1974, p.69) 
indicate that the average size of a pond in the Prairie pothole region was determined to be 
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Figure 4: May Ponds (1955-2009) and Subsidy per Cultivated Hectare (1955-2008), 
Prairie Provinces 
 
Hansen (2009) provides information on the costs of restoring wetlands based on 
the USDA’s Wetlands Restoration Program. For the prairie pothole area, average 
restoration costs rose from $545 per acre ($1,346 per ha) for the 25
th percentile to $1,160 
($3,132/ha) for the 50
th percentile, and $1,953 ($4,824/ha) for the 75
th percentile (in 2007  
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th percentiles, respectively. It is important, however, to recognize that 
payments under this Program are for wetlands over and above ones that might be 
considered ‘permanent’ as landowners have never made the effort to convert them to 
cropland. The least number of ponds during the period 1955-2009 was 1.439 million in 
2002 when precipitation was low.
9
B&H (1973, 1974) and Brown et al. (1976) use two functional forms for the 
waterfowl production function – a double-logarithmic form (or Cobb-Douglas) and a 
Beverton-Holt production function. The respective functional forms are: 
 The cost to the authority of providing this minimum 
level of wetlands is likely close to zero; indeed, costs are likely not incurred until 
wetlands rise above about 2.0 million and then only if there are significant subsidies to 
landowners (see Figure 4). With increased emphasis on biofuels, it is likely that 
conditions similar to those occurring in 1987 and 2003-2005 can be expected to prevail in 
the future. For simplicity, we assume that the marginal cost of protecting a pond is 
constant. Given that the cost is zero for the first 2 million ponds, the values in Hansen are 
likely far too high. Therefore, we employ a range between $70 and $120 for the marginal 
cost per pond, and use the low value ($360) provided in Hansen as sensitivity analysis. 
g(Dt, Wt) = 
2 1 ϕ ϕ
t t W AD  and  (13a) 















t t W d D
d
.  (13b) 
                                                 
9 The maximum number of May ponds was 7.302 million, but this occurred in 1955 and 
might be considered an outlier. Ignoring this value, the maximum of 6.390 million 
occurred in 1974.  
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As the number of breeding ducks grows to infinity, the number of offspring grows 
indefinitely large in the case of the Cobb-Douglas production function, but is bounded by 
the available habitat (the ecosystem carrying capacity) in the case of the Beverton-Holt 




t W d  asymptotically. We also examine a standard logistic 
growth function (which is now commonly used in bioeconomic models):  















rD 1   (13c) 
where g
b
t W is the carrying capacity of the prairie pothole ecosystem. 
We have data on breeding ducks and immature offspring, and on wetlands (May 
pond counts), for the Prairie Pothole region of southern Alberta, Saskatchewan and 
Manitoba (strata 26 through 40) over the period 1955 to 2009. We also have data on July 
ponds for the period 1955-2003, U.S. duck harvests for the Central flyway for the period 
1961-2008, and Canadian harvests of ducks for the period 1969-2008. We use this data to 
estimate the relationships 13(c) and 13(a). Similar to H&B, we find that May ponds 
provide a better statistical fit than July ponds, so we present only the regression results 
with May ponds.  
The regression results are as follows:
10
g(Dt, Wt) = 
 
608 . 0 924 . 0 880 . 0 W D , R
2 = 0.6715, se = 0.3379, n=54  (14a) 
                  (0.32)    (4.73)     (3.59) 
                                                 
10 The t-statistics are in parenthesis below the expression in which the estimated 
coefficient is found and are based on Newey-West HAC standard errors.   
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g(Dt, Wt) = 
1
024 . 2 668 . 5










2 = 0.6715, se = 6.2645, n=52  (14b) 
                      (4.88)     (1.79)  (2.85)  






50 . 1 48 . 8
1 18 . 2
W
D
D ,   R
2 = 0.677, se = 6.3423, n=52  (14c) 
                  (8.56)        (3.24) (3.52) 
Unlike H&B’s (1974, p.49) regression, our Cobb-Douglas production function (14a) does 
not exhibit constant returns to scale as the sum of the estimated coefficients exceeds 1.0 
(0.924+0.608=1.532), indicating increasing returns to scale production. If we apply the 
estimated parameters of Cobb-Douglas equation 14(a), we find that increases in the costs 
of restoring wetlands are offset in the steady state by unbounded increases in optimal 
breeding populations, an unrealistic result. For the estimated parameters of the Beverton-
Holt model in (14b), the dynamic model turns out to be highly unstable, which is not 
unusual as noted by van Kooten and Bulte (2000, p.184). Consequently, we rely on the 
estimated logistics growth function (14c) in the numerical analysis. 
Finally, we employ H&B’s (1974, p.50) values for intra-year survival rates for the 
period between breeding in May and the start of hunting season in September (s1) and the 
period after hunting season until breeding begins (s2). Brown et al. (1976) assume 5% of 
duck kills are not reported, and we use this factor to account for underreporting of bird 
kills by hunters. Loomis and White (1996) report non-consumptive use values for several 
endangered bird species, which are quite large for some species such as Whooping Crane. 
Ducks and geese tend to be plentiful, so their value to bird watchers and other viewers 
tends to be smaller. Therefore, we use a very low value and a value equal to the lowest 
value of an endangered species as reported by Loomis and White.   
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4.  NUMERICAL SIMULATION RESULTS 
We determine the steady-state solutions by solving the system of equations (8) in 
the case where only hunter values are considered and the system (12) if wetlands are 
considered to have value. A summary of the functions and parameter values used in the 
simulations is provided in Table 2. Table 3 presents steady state values of ducks, harvests 
and wetlands. These results correspond to the base case values provided in Table 2. 
Optimal values for ducks and ponds in Table 3 are calibrated to the Canadian 
prairie pothole region, because the production function was estimated using prairie 
pothole duck and pond data. The harvest is the combined kill in the U.S. Mississippi, 
Central and Pacific regions, while the duck valuation function was based on a survey 
conducted in the Pacific region. In order to calibrate the duck valuation function to other 
flyways, it is assumed that people’s preferences are similar across regions. 
From Table 3, several patterns are discernable when the costs of wetlands 
restoration are varied. First, using Hansen’s (2009) lowest estimated cost of wetland 
restoration, $360 per pond, the level of ponds, ducks and harvests is extremely small 
relative to historical levels. Further, using a cost of $12-$17 per pond, such as in Brown 
and Hammack (1973), it is optimal to restore an extremely high number of ponds, with 
consequently high steady-state levels of ducks and harvests. For the current model, we 
use a range of costs for wetland restoration between $70 and $115 per pond. As discussed 
above, the costs estimated in Hansen (2009) are only to be incurred after the first two 
million ponds or so, in which case the average cost per pond would be much lower.   
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Table 2: Model Sensitivity Functions and Parameters used in Simulations 
Item  Base Case Value  Sensitivity Value 
Marginal hunter 
benefit function  ∂v/∂h = 46.863 h
–0.6  ∂v/∂h = 42.568 h
–0.4 
Marginal product of 




–2.5  ∂g/∂W = 0.535 D
0.924 W
–0.392 
Marginal product of 
breeding ducks  ∂g/∂D = 2.18–0.514DW





s1 = 0.95 
s2 = 0.80 
s1 = 0.95 
s2 = 0.85 
Marginal cost of 
protecting wetlands  c = C′(W) = $70, 90, 115, 360  c = C′(W) = $70, 90, 115, 360 
Marginal amenity 
value of wetlands  B′(W) = $10.00  B′(W) = $20 
Marginal non-hunting 
value of a duck  α = $1  α = $2 
Adjustment for 
underreporting of kills  π =1.05  π =1.05 
 
Table 3: Historic and Steady State Values of Ponds, Ducks and 
Harvests, Various Costs of Wetlands Restoration (millions)  
Item  Ponds (W)  Ducks (D)  Harvests (h) 
Historic 
a  3.5  13.5  14.1 
Cost=$70/pond     
Hunter value  3.5  22.7  17.2 
Amenity value  15.0  256.0  1q55.0 
Cost=$90/pond     
Hunter value  1.9  8.8  6.7 
Amenity value  3.8  28.0  19.0 
Cost=$115/pond     
Hunter value  1.0  3.5  2.7 
Amenity value  1.6  7.2  5.3 
Cost=$360/pond     
Hunter value  0.05  0.04  0.03 
Amenity value  0.09  0.10  0.07 
a Source: Ponds and ducks are for Canada’s prairie region and based on the average of 
1955-2008 data from the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (http://mbdcapps.fws.gov/); harvest 






Second, for a basic model similar to that of Brown and Hammack (1973) but with 
a cost of $90 per pond, optimal wetlands, ducks and harvests are projected to be 1.9, 8.8 
and 6.7 million, respectively. These values are all smaller than historical values, a result 
that is contrary to H&B (1973). However, as one decreases the cost of ponds, the optimal 
value of all of these variables increases significantly. 
Third, a key result from Table 3 is that the addition of wetland amenity values and 
in-situ values of ducks will lead to increased wetlands, ducks and harvests. Clearly, 
increasing the marginal benefit of a pond should increase the number of ponds, although 
it also leads to an increase in ducks and harvests as a result of greater breeding habitat. 
Further, increasing α – the amenity value of a duck – will decrease the shadow value of 
the marginal duck to hunters, indicating that the planner needs to raise the population of 
waterfowl over that in the previous model where ducks only had value to hunters. The 
increase in ducks will also impact ponds and harvests. When the cost of wetlands 
restoration is $90/pond, optimal ponds, ducks and harvests are 3.76, 28 and 19 million, 
respectively. These values are much higher for the same restoration cost levels than those 
provided in the model that uses only hunter values, and are also higher than historical 
levels. 
Finally, in addition to the actual values obtained in Table 3, ratios of ducks per 
pond and harvests per pond are also easily obtained by solving the basic model using 
only hunter values. These ratios are similar when we add amenity values, although more 
complicated expressions result. For May pond data, the historical levels are 3.85 and 4.02 
ducks and harvests per pond, respectively. In the current model, the optimal level of  
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ducks and harvests to ponds is 3.5W
1.5 and 2.65W
1.5, respectively.  This can be verified 
using the values in Table 3. Using the average May pond count for the period 1955 to 
2008 (3.5 million), the model projects optimal duck numbers at 22.9 per pond and 
harvests of 17.35 per pond. Thus, historic levels of both waterfowl and harvests are too 
low from a social planner’s perspective for the given the number of wetlands. When 
amenity values are included, the ratio of ducks and harvests to ponds is larger than in the 
original model, despite the increased value of ponds. This is due to the fact that the 
amenity values of ducks increases the optimal number of ducks (and therefore harvests), 
while the greater number of wetlands will further increase ducks and harvests. 
In addition to being sensitive to different levels of wetlands restoration costs, the 
results are quite sensitive to functional forms and parameter values. Both an increase in 
the marginal nonmarket value of ponds and the amenity value of ducks will raise optimal 
wetlands, ducks and harvests. This is seen in Table 4, which compares values in Table 3 
to those using B′(W) values of $20 and α values of $2 per duck, for wetlands restoration 
costs of $90 and $115 per pond. Note that, for the parameters chosen here, the ratios of 
ducks and ponds increases as we increase the marginal benefit of ponds and the amenity 
value of ducks.  
Furthermore, different specifications of the waterfowl production and duck 
valuation functions will impact the results. Using a Cobb-Douglas form, we get 
increasing returns to scale (14a), as discussed above. This will result in significantly 
higher duck and harvest levels than could realistically occur and results are not included 
here. Even changing the parameters on the current duck valuation function, such that 
∂v/∂h = 42.568 h
–0.4, will result in values of wetlands, ducks and harvests than are  
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significantly higher than those in Table 3. The impact of functional form can be seen by 
comparing the results in Table 3 with those of Table 5, which includes different 
functional forms for production and in-situ duck values, for wetlands restoration costs of 
$90 and $115 per pond. 
 
Table 4: Sensitivity of Ponds and Ducks to Changes in to Amenity 
Values, Millions 
 Item  Ponds (W)  Ducks (D)  Harvests (h) 
Historic values  3.5  13.5  14.1 
  Cost=$90/pond 
Hunter value  1.9  8.8  6.7 
Amenity values       
B′(W) =10, α=1  3.8  28.0  19.0 
B′(W) =20, α=1  6.6  66.8  44.9 
B′(W) =10, α=2  7.0  78.9  48.5 
  Cost=$115/pond 
Hunter value  1.0  3.5  2.7 
Amenity values       
B′(W) =10, α=1  1.6  7.2  5.3 
B′(W) =20, α=1  2.1  11.5  8.3 
B′(W) =10, α=2  2.0  10.8  7.5 
       
 
Results are clearly very sensitive to functional form and parameter values; yet, 
there are some key policy conclusions, the second and third of which reinforce the earlier 
findings by H&B (1973, 1974). First, from the social planner’s point of view, the optimal 
management of waterfowl is such that wetlands, ducks and harvests should all be higher 
than historically observed levels. Second, it is important to add amenity values in the 
current model; including amenity values significantly increases the level of wetlands, 
ducks and harvests relative to a model that does not include these values. Third, based on  
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the results in this model, the level of ducks and harvest relative to the level of May ponds 
should be higher than historically observed levels. 
Table 5: Sensitivity to Duck Valuation Function 
Item  Ponds (W)  Ducks (D)  Harvests (h) 
  (millions) 
Historic Value  3.5  13.5  14.1 
Cost = $90/pond; ∂v/∂h = 46.863 h
–0.6 
Hunter Value  1.9  8.8  6.7 
Amenity Values  3.8  28.0  19.0 
Cost = $90/pond; ∂v/∂h = 42.568 h
–0.4 
Hunters Value  32.0  657.0  497.0 
Amenity Values  8.9  81.0  69.0 
Cost = $115/pond; ∂v/∂h = 46.863 h
–0.6 
Hunters Value  1.0  3.5  2.7 
Amenity Values  1.6  7.2  5.3 
Cost = $115/pond; ∂v/∂h = 42.568 h
–0.4 
Hunters Value  2.8  16.8  12.6 
Amenity Values  10.6  122.0  93.0 
 
5.  CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS 
Gardner Brown and Judd Hammack were the first to employ bioeconomic 
modeling in a wildlife context, demonstrating that, on the basis of duck hunting values 
alone, the socially optimal level of wetlands protection was below the existing level. In 
coming to this conclusion, these researchers ignored the ecosystem service and other 
amenity benefits associated with wetlands as well as the benefits people get from viewing 
waterfowl. In this study, we sought first to duplicate their results and then extend their 
analysis to include nonmarket in-situ values of waterfowl and wetlands. While we could 
duplicate their results for the parameters they had estimated, we found that estimates  
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using updated data led to a Cobb-Douglas production function with increasing returns to 
scale in wetlands and breeding ducks, leading to an unrealistic result. For the Beverton-
Holt model parameters of equation (14b), the dynamic model turned out to be highly 
unstable. For these reasons, we used a logistic production function that is commonly used 
in bioeconomic wildlife models.  
When the model based only on hunting values was expanded to include the non-
consumptive use value of waterfowl and the ecosystem service and amenity values of 
wetlands, the optimal steady-state levels of ducks and wetlands to retain increased 
significantly. Thus, Brown and Hammack’s (1973) original conclusion was reinforced – 
the numbers of wetlands protected in the Canadian prairie pothole region is less than 
what is socially optimal.  
In our analysis, we relied exclusively on sensitivity analysis to address 
randomness, recognizing that this does not lead the authority to take explicit account of 
such uncertainty in making decisions. That is, optimal management strategies obtained 
from sensitivity analysis are not necessarily optimal from the perspective of a planner 
who considers randomness in the decision calculus. Future research needs to take 
uncertainty into explicit account, including uncertainty related to future climate change. 
In addition to uncertainty, it is important that future research also take into account 
spatial aspects.  
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